Türkiye’s independent foreign policy
Throughout this turbulent period, Türkiye has occupied one of the most distinctive positions within NATO. Three axes stand out.
Ukraine–Russia: Türkiye supplied Ukraine with unmanned aerial vehicles and weapons systems and closed the Straits to warships under the Montreux Convention, preventing Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea Fleet.
At the same time, Türkiye hosted multiple rounds of negotiations in Istanbul throughout 2025.
Talks led by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan brought both sides to the table over ceasefire terms, but no concrete progress was made. Türkiye remains one of the rare actors keeping the negotiating floor intact.
YPG/PKK: For over a decade, Türkiye warned the US not to support the YPG — the Syrian affiliate of the PKK terrorist organisation — but Washington ignored those warnings.
In January 2026, the US Special Envoy for Syria announced that the SDF’s role as the “primary anti-ISIS force” had “largely come to an end,” and the terrorist organisation’s structures were effectively dismantled over a process lasting several weeks.
Washington had, in effect, conceded Ankara’s long-standing argument — belatedly, but unmistakably.
Israel: Türkiye was among the rare NATO members to condemn Israel’s policies in Gaza from the outset.
That stance earned Ankara a distinctive position in the Muslim world and reinforced Türkiye’s regional standing and credibility.
Separately, Türkiye’s ties with the US and Europe have entered a new era of normalisation
Longstanding issues have not been fully resolved, but the relationship has gained significant momentum toward normalisation.
In September 2025, Erdogan was invited to the White House for the first time since 2019.
In March 2026, the US Department of Justice reached a deferred prosecution agreement with Halkbank — explicitly linking the deal to Türkiye’s contributions to the Gaza negotiations and the 2025 ceasefire efforts.
Trump also signalled a positive disposition on the F-35 and CAATSA sanctions files.
The most tangible marker of normalisation with Europe has been the Eurofighter process: the sale of 40 fighter jets, blocked by Germany for years, was approved in 2025.
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Türkiye’s defence revolution and rise of a Middle Power
Türkiye is no longer merely a buyer from NATO — it has become a seller.
Eurofighter: Germany’s veto was lifted in June 2025. In October 2025, Erdogan and UK Prime Minister Starmer signed an agreement worth nine billion euros for 20 Eurofighter jets.
HURJET–Spain: Through a consortium formed by TAI, Airbus and Spanish companies, 30 supersonic trainer aircraft will be delivered. Spain’s industry holds a 60 percent share — a co-production model that goes well beyond a conventional sale.
NATO’s first electronic warfare sale: ASELSAN exported a 410-million-dollar electronic warfare system to Poland — the first such sale ever made to a NATO member.
Bayraktar TB3: During NATO’s Steadfast Dart 2026 exercise, the TB3 launched from TCG Anadolu and became the first naval unmanned aerial vehicle to fire live munitions during a NATO exercise in the Baltic Sea.
KAAN: The serial production contract is expected to be signed in 2026. Preliminary talks on the KAAN have also been confirmed as part of Spain’s search for a fifth-generation fighter aircraft.
Türkiye’s defence and aerospace exports reached a historic record of ten billion dollars in 2025.
But rather than economic weight or ideological appeal, Türkiye is positioning itself in the global arena through its geographic centrality and deep-rooted network of relationships.
The list of entries in Türkiye’s mediation record spans Afghanistan to the Balkans, the Horn of Africa to the Caucasus: the Ukraine–Russia negotiating floor and the Grain Corridor; the December 2024 Ankara Declaration that defused the Ethiopia–Somalia tension; diplomatic channels in Libya and Syria; and a bridging role in US–Russia prisoner exchanges.
Twenty-two years ago in Istanbul, Erdogan opened doors to new members as Prime Minister.
Now, as President, he sits at the head of the table that will determine in which direction NATO moves — and under whose leadership.
Throughout this process, Türkiye has not played a single role but three complementary ones simultaneously: NATO’s second-largest military force, a global mediator, and the natural anchor of the alliance’s southeastern flank.
On July 7–8, Ankara is not merely hosting a summit. It is setting the stage for one of the most critical chapters in history — the chapter in which NATO 3.0 will be unveiled, and perhaps in which the alliance’s new identity will be written.
