When French President Emmanuel Macron arrived in Nairobi in May 2026 for the Africa Forward Summit, he brought an ambitious offer: €23 billion in investment commitments, promises of equal partnership, and a message that France was ready to turn a new page in its relationship with Africa.
Yet for many observers across the continent, the question was less about what Macron brought than about what France left behind.
Over the previous three years, France had been pushed out of a string of African countries. Military leaders in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled French troops.
Chad followed suit. Even long-standing partners, such as Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, requested a reduction or withdrawal of France’s military presence.
The retreat marked one of the most dramatic setbacks for French influence in Africa since independence.
It also raised a deeper question: can France genuinely reinvent its relationship with Africa, or is it merely seeking new partners after losing old ones?
A declaration that raised eyebrows
One moment at the Nairobi summit captured the tensions surrounding France’s renewed engagement with Africa.
“We are the true Pan-Africanists,” Macron declared.
The remark quickly drew attention. Pan-Africanism is rooted in struggles against colonialism, slavery and racial domination.
It is a political and intellectual tradition associated with figures such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Thomas Sankara.
For some, hearing France’s president invoke Pan-Africanist language highlighted how difficult it remains for Paris to navigate its complex history with Africa.
That history continues to shape perceptions of France across much of the continent today.
Unlike Britain’s largely indirect model of colonial administration, France pursued a more ambitious assimilation project. The objective was not merely political control but cultural transformation.
The French language, education and institutions were promoted as vehicles through which colonial subjects could become part of a broader French identity.
“The French perpetuated a culture of France in these countries, where people were socialised into believing that they could become French citizens,” Christopher Like, Professor of African Politics and International Relations at the University of Pretoria, tells TRT Afrika.
“In practice, what this meant was that many African leaders were propped up by French support in exchange for favourable policies and access to their countries’ resources. What that perpetuated was corruption and authoritarianism, and that is the direct line to the widespread discontent we see today in Francophone West Africa.”
Following independence, France retained influence through a system that became known as Françafrique.
The arrangement extended beyond diplomatic ties. It included military agreements, intelligence cooperation, political networks and economic structures that bound former colonies to Paris long after formal colonial rule ended.
One of the most visible symbols was the CFA franc, the currency used by 14 African countries and historically linked to France through monetary agreements.
“Many of France’s former colonies had their central banks controlled by France,” says Like.
“When they needed money for development, they would go to France to apply for loans and France would determine how much to give them, even though this was their own money. When you know that, you begin to understand some of the anti-French sentiments you see in Francophone Africa today.”
According to security and geopolitical analyst Fidel Amakwe Oguzu, former French President Charles De Gaulle built a system that served even broader strategic objectives.
“De Gaulle understood that after independence there would be many African countries represented in the UN General Assembly,” he tells TRT Afrika.
“If France wanted influence there, it needed those votes. This was about resources, yes, but it was also about maintaining France’s position at the global table through its African relationships.”
Countries that challenged the arrangement often faced consequences.
Looking east
The collapse of French influence in the Sahel marked the end of an era in a region once regarded as central to France’s African strategy.
Faced with declining influence in its traditional sphere, France has increasingly looked beyond Francophone Africa.
The decision to host the Africa Forward Summit in Kenya was widely interpreted as part of that shift.
Kenya is not a former French colony. It is East Africa’s largest economy and a major hub for technology, renewable energy and regional trade.
For some analysts, however, the choice raises questions.
“What would have conveyed genuine remorse and genuine partnership would have been to return to those countries where France has had difficult relationships and begin addressing some of the damaging policies of the past,” says Like.
“Instead, France appears to be pivoting toward Anglophone Africa. Is this a genuine desire to engage more broadly, or is it simply a case of ‘if I am not wanted here, I will go somewhere else’?”
