Other societies are further ahead in this regard. Finland’s “total defence” is the most comprehensive concept, practically integrating even people of other nationalities residing in the country.
There, the answer to the John F Kennedy question is put into practice: what can everyone do for their country, not just what they expect from the state?
Leadership without trust, rearmament without a narrative
If Germany wants to build the strongest conventional army in Europe, the question inevitably arises: Why?
What threat situation is it based on? With whom and against what? The answer cannot be solely military. It must be a societal one, embedded in a vision of European and global security that Germany actively helps to shape.
This is precisely where the real shortcoming lies.
There is a lack of German impetus for European integration and a lack of a discernible concept of how Germany intends to assume leadership and responsibility without reviving old fears of German hegemony.
For France, Poland, the Baltic states, and the smaller EU members, it is unclear what Germany actually intends to do with its growing military capabilities.
The “German question” has not disappeared. Rearmament without a political framework is not a signal of security – it is a signal of insecurity.
And then there’s always the question of money – and people.
Hundreds of billions for the German armed forces, and not just a one-off, but over a long period: that’s money that can’t be spent elsewhere, even after a reform of the debt brake.
On climate crisis, education, healthcare, infrastructure, and social security.
A society that is simultaneously ageing, lamenting a severe shortage of skilled workers, and seeing its welfare state under pressure, cannot simply finance military buildup “on top” without setting priorities.
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This balancing act is hardly ever discussed openly. Instead, special funds are presented as a technical solution, as if the societal debate could be circumvented through accounting.
Furthermore, who is supposed to provide this army?
Germany has an ageing population, a military facing recruitment problems, and a generation of young people who have grown up with Bundeswehr recruitment ads but rarely consider serving themselves, let alone in a military conflict.
A professional army of the size required to achieve this goal is simply unattainable without a structural societal discussion about military service, compulsory service, or incentives, especially when 20 percent of the population was not born in Germany and has been socialised differently.
What is needed now
All of this does not mean that the political direction is wrong. The security situation in Europe is serious. Russia’s war with Ukraine is not an episode, but aims to change the European security architecture. Hybrid attacks happen every day.
And yes: Europe must strengthen its defences, and Germany must contribute a greater share. But the path to achieving this requires more than resolutions and budget lines. It requires a societal debate worthy of the name – open, honest, and without false reassurances.
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There are examples of political leadership taking the people of the country seriously and involving them in decision-making, so that crises were dealt with collectively: in the aftermath of German reunification, during the pandemic, and in the first winter after the Russia’s war with Ukraine, when energy had to be saved.
Germany must decide what it wants to become: a civilian power with defence capabilities or a military leader with a civilian veneer – but also one that takes on greater responsibility in Europe, with all the consequences for the future of European integration.
Both are conceivable. But both require clarity – towards its allies, especially towards past victims of German militarism, towards its own society, and towards its history, from which Germany can never completely break free.
To build the strongest army in Europe without this clarity: that would be the real strategic error.
This article was originally published on TRT DEUTSCH
