Türkiye’s relationship with NATO cannot be understood solely as a military alliance. For Ankara, the alliance also signifies foreign policy flexibility, economic ties and a stronger position within the Western system.
Türkiye is a NATO member, but it also maintains active relations with countries outside the alliance, including those in the Middle East, the Caucasus, Africa, and Central Asia.
This gives Ankara room to act as a bridge between NATO and wider regions.
At the same time, NATO is economically important. In the past year, Türkiye’s defence and aerospace exports reached $10.9 billion, with 57 percent of these exports going to NATO countries.
This shows that Türkiye’s place in the alliance is also linked to industrial growth, trade networks and defence partnerships.
The 2026 Ankara Summit is more than a diplomatic event; it is a testament to two decades of structural change. NATO leaders, defence industry representatives, diplomatic delegations and international media will gather in Ankara.
Whereas the 2004 Istanbul Summit was marked by Türkiye’s reliance on external procurement and alliance support, the 2026 gathering in Ankara reflects a nation that has successfully pivoted towards domestic production, strategic autonomy, and collaborative security partnerships.
This choice has symbolic value. It shows that Ankara is not only Türkiye’s capital, but also an important centre for international security diplomacy.
At the 2004 NATO Summit in Istanbul, Türkiye was best known for its strategic location, military capacity and role on NATO’s southeastern flank.
At the time, NATO’s agenda was shaped by the fight against terrorism, operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Iraq, the transformation of the alliance and emerging security threats.
This agenda made Türkiye an important member of the Western security system because of its geography, military strength and proximity to crisis regions.
So, Türkiye’s contribution to NATO during that period was still understood largely in terms of its location and military manpower rather than its defence industry. Its defence sector depended largely on foreign procurement, joint production and technology transfer.
In this sense, the 2004 Istanbul Summit reflected a period when NATO was focused on transformation and operational capabilities, while Türkiye was still seeking to strengthen its defence capacity within a system largely shaped by external suppliers and alliance support.
By 2026, Türkiye’s position within NATO had changed.
This time, Türkiye will not only be present as the country with NATO’s second-largest army, but also as one with a defence industry that has grown significantly over the last twenty years.
The main change between the 2004 Istanbul Summit and the 2026 Ankara Summit is Türkiye’s gradual shift from being a “consumer” to becoming a country that produces and exports security.
The clearest sign of this change is evident in export figures.
According to data from the Presidency of Defence Industries, Türkiye’s defence and aerospace exports were approximately $196 million in 2004.
In 2025, this figure hit $10.054 billion, implying Türkiye’s defence and aerospace exports increased roughly 51 times since 2004.
Growth was not limited to exports. It was also evident in the sector’s institutional capacity. In 2004, the number of defence projects carried out in Türkiye was 84. Today, this number has risen to more than 1,400, an increase of more than 16-fold.
During the same period, the value of defence projects increased from about $8 billion to over $100 billion, including ongoing tenders, representing roughly a 12.5-fold increase.
These figures are important for understanding why Türkiye’s role within NATO has changed. In 2004, Türkiye was largely a country that bought systems from abroad, carried out modernisation programmes, and sought technology transfer.
By 2026, Türkiye had developed a broader defence ecosystem. This ecosystem includes unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and armed drone systems, ammunition, electronic warfare, radar systems, armoured vehicles and air defence systems.
One of the most critical aspects of this transformation is air defence. Türkiye’s security experience in recent years has shown that missile and air defence capacity is directly linked to foreign policy and alliance relations.
