Devecioglu says the US military possesses sufficient naval and air capabilities to manage simultaneous operations in both areas.
But the real challenge the US faces is that of strategic sustainability, not military capacity, he insists.
Maintaining two active maritime security theatres “significantly increases” operational costs, stretches naval assets, and raises the risk of escalation through miscalculation, he says.
Therefore, the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz should not be viewed as separate fronts.
“They form an interconnected maritime security system linking the Mediterranean, Bab al Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and the Gulf,” he says.
Any escalation in one chokepoint inevitably affects shipping patterns, insurance costs, and military deployments across the entire regional trade architecture.
Even if Washington can manage both theatres militarily, an extended period of war will require greater burden-sharing with allies and regional partners, Devecioglu says.
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Effect on Iran’s proxy strategy
A more direct intervention by the US in Yemen will also have a significant impact on Iran’s broader strategy in the region.
It will directly challenge Tehran’s forward deterrence strategy, which relies on empowering non-state partners to impose costs, while avoiding direct interstate confrontation, according to Devecioglu.
The Houthis have become “one of Tehran’s most strategically valuable partners” because they can threaten a critical maritime chokepoint “at relatively low cost”.
If sustained US operations significantly degrade Houthi capabilities, Iran may seek to compensate by increasing support for other proxy networks in Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere, thereby dispersing pressure across multiple fronts, he notes.
At the same time, Tehran is expected to avoid actions that can trigger “direct conventional conflict” with the US, favouring instead “calibrated escalation, asymmetric warfare, and deniable proxy operations” to preserve strategic ambiguity.
Pelayo agrees with the assessment that the Houthis remain Tehran’s “most functional proxy” after the war.
The group can still deliver escalation against the US, causing a “significant impact” on Red Sea traffic, freedom of navigation and the global economy.
Simultaneous strikes in Iran and against the Houthis will demonstrate to Tehran that activating another proxy will not dissuade the US from war despite high costs, he says.
At the same time, the blockade announced by the Houthis provides Iran with a “halfway strategy of escalation on call” instead of fully committing its proxy to enter the war, he observes.
The risks of escalation in the Red Sea remain substantial, particularly for Saudi Arabia, which is completely reliant on this export corridor after the closure of Hormuz by Iran.
Pelayo warns that further attacks can significantly affect Saudi Arabia’s workaround scenario to use the Red Sea, impacting energy prices with no real land alternatives in the short term to move oil.
“Further attacks on Saudi infrastructure would stretch Riyadh and significantly impact the country’s stability,” he says.
